Competitive mode: Vertical control and contractual design in the poultry industry - a comparative study between Brazil and Denmark by Similä, Jan Ole
Informe Gepec, Toledo, v. 18, n. 2, p. 147-162, jul./dez. 2014 
Competitive mode: Vertical control and contractual design in 
the poultry industry - a comparative study between Brazil and 
Denmark 
Modelo competitivo: o controle vertical e o design contratual na indústria avícola - 
um estudo comparativo entre Brasil e Dinamarca 
 
Jan Ole Similä 
Nord-Trøndelag University College. 
 
Abstract: How do you see the competition in your industry?  How do you see your business dealing 
with the actual situation? There are of course several and different answers to these questions, 
depending on your competitive mode. Maybe it is a choice of market strategy, cost strategy, resource-
based strategy, institutional strategy, or my choice of approach, namely a structural strategy. More 
precisely, I am looking at the economic organization of production, which Williamson (1991) names 
second-order economizing – regarding the governance structures. We are not doing the mathematics 
in trying to calculate efficiency, losses or benefits, as we do not have access to that kind of data. In 
some countries it would be possible to get hold of economic data that would make it possible to 
calculate possible benefits, while in other countries, companies are not required to go public with their 
accountings. You will find that companies deliberately tamper with their financial statements (‘cook 
their books’), when asked about details in the economy of the production. Going along with the 
possibilities, what we do want to achieve is a better understanding of why different governance 
structures are chosen within the same industry. In this article we look at two companies engaged in 
large-scale industrial production, where one company is located in Brazil and the other in Denmark. 
The setups of the companies are completely different, where in Brazil strong vertical integration and 
control is emphasized, this is not equally prominent in Denmark. 
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Resumo: Como você vê a competição em seu setor? Como você vê o seu negócio lidar com a situação 
real? Há, naturalmente, várias e diferentes respostas a estas perguntas, dependendo do seu modo 
competitivo. Talvez seja uma escolha de estratégia de mercado, estratégia de custos, estratégia baseada 
em recursos, a estratégia institucional, ou a minha escolha de abordagem, ou seja, uma estratégia 
estrutural. Mais precisamente, eu estou olhando para a organização econômica da produção, que 
Williamson (1991) chama de “second-order economizing” - em relação às estruturas de governança. 
Nós não estamos fazendo a matemática na tentativa de calcular a eficiência, perdas ou benefícios, 
como não temos acesso a esse tipo de dados. Em alguns países, seria possível de se apossar de dados 
econômicos que tornaria possível calcular possíveis benefícios, enquanto em outros países, as 
empresas não são obrigadas a ir a público com suas contabilidades. Você vai descobrir que empresas 
deliberadamente mexem em suas demonstrações financeiras (“cook their books”), quando 
questionado sobre detalhes na economia da produção. Indo junto com as possibilidades, o que 
queremos alcançar é uma melhor compreensão de por que diferentes estruturas de governança são 
escolhidos dentro de um mesmo setor. Neste artigo vamos olhar para duas empresas envolvidas na 
produção industrial em larga escala, onde uma empresa está localizada no Brasil e outro na 
Dinamarca. As configurações das empresas são completamente diferentes, onde no Brasil forte 
integração e controle vertical é enfatizada, isso não é igualmente proeminente na Dinamarca. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Modo competitivo; Controle Vertical; Projeto contratual; Agronegócio. 
 
JEL: L22 
 
Introduction 
 
How is your organization geared in order to take on the competition? What is 
your competitive mode? By competitive mode, I mean the overall understanding of 
the situation, the degree of willingness to compete, and of course the alignment of the 
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business in order to be successful. When talking to people in the poultry industry they 
tend to frame the overall situation as being very demanding, both in regard to public 
regulations and also in regard to the market situation. Public regulations have a lot to 
do with environmental issues and animal health issues. Regarding the market, there 
are a number of issues like access to supply of feed, small chicks, grown chicks, 
customer’s expectation for instance on quality and stable delivery. From the literature 
we can see that product pricing, and hence production cost, is a key element for 
competition in the industry. Bio-security, quality, and optimization of capital 
resources are also important factors (HENRY and ROTHWELL 1995, MARTINEZ 
2002). Further, avoiding unnecessary disruption in the production process is 
considered important (Gilson et al. 2009 and Martinez 2002). 
Looking at different approaches to competitive strategies provided by Porter 
(1980), the cost leadership strategy, the differentiation strategy, and the focus 
strategy, it seems to be the cost leadership strategy that dominates the poultry 
industry. Economizing will of course be important if the company needs to work on 
controlling and lowering production costs. In this respect Williamson (1991) deals 
with three levels of economizing. First order economizing has to do with adaptation 
to the surrounding environment and institutions, and reducing bureaucracy and 
waste in the organization. Second order economizing has to do with getting the 
governance structures right, aligning transactions with governance structures in a 
transaction cost economizing way. Third order economizing has to do with getting the 
marginal conditions, like pricing, quantities and incentives aligned. In this paper we 
focus mostly on the second order economizing. We do this because there seems to be 
a perception, based on both the literature and dialogue with people in the business, 
that the standard, or benchmark, in the industry is vertical integration, or at least 
strong vertical control. Third order economizing might also be touched upon, 
depending on how you define the contracts within the vertical structure, as an outline 
of regular performance indicators or as incentives in a more market based structure.  
The two cases we have been looking into are relatively big producers focusing 
mostly on frozen chickens that are not further processed. Some of the production is of 
course sold as fresh meat and some is processed. The Brazilian company has chosen a 
strong degree of vertical integration and also strong vertical control in relation to 
their chicken breeders. The Danish company is on the opposite end of the ‘scale’, no 
vertical integration and seemingly little vertical control. The question we want to 
explore in this article is how different companies in the same industry choose to 
approach competition in regard to their choice of their governance structure and 
contractual design, broadly described as the company’s competitive mode. Before 
dealing with the cases, we will run through both transaction cost theory and agency 
theory, and of course also comment on state of the art within the poultry industry. 
Data is collected through interviews, document studies and literature review.   
 
2. Vertical integration in the poultry industry 
 
The predominant view is that vertical integration represents one extreme of an 
organizational continuum, ranging from vertical integration to the spot market; 
“inherent in the notion of vertical integration is the elimination of contractual or 
market exchanges” (PERRY, 1989:185). Furthermore, most agree that vertical 
integration means that the entity has ownership of the means of production, and thus 
has the power to make decisions about investment, employment, production and 
distribution. In reality it might be that what is described as a vertically integrated 
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chain of production, combines solutions that involve ownership and contractual 
control – see Perry (1989) who writes that: “a firm can be described as vertically 
integrated if it encompasses two single-out-put production processes…” (p. 185). 
On selecting governance structure Williamson (1979) suggests we have a closer 
look into three dimensions: Level of transaction-specific investments, transaction 
frequency and uncertainty. In theory the combination of high transaction frequency, 
transaction specific investments and uncertainty should lead to vertical integration. 
When transaction frequency is low, no transaction-specific investments are made and 
when uncertainty is low, the market solution is to be preferred.  
"The poultry industry is characterized in most countries by a high level of 
vertical coordination ..." (HENRY and ROTHWELL 1995:1). From the North 
American broiler industry, we see that "Integrators usually own hatcheries, feed 
mills, slaughter plants, and further processing plants-that is, they may be vertically 
integrated into all stages except for broiler production, where they rely on networks 
of growers assembled through production contracts" (MAcDONALD, (2008:3). 
Denmark has almost the same structure as in Norway, with limited coordination 
between the various stages in the value chain (ANDERSEN et al. 2008). In Brazil 
there appears to be a large variation in the degree of vertical integration. According to 
Silva et al. (2005) the Brazilian poultry industry varies between vertical integration at 
one extreme through partnership contracts and informal agreements, to the use of 
the spot market at the other extreme. Parana, representing the more modern part of 
the industry in Brazil, where significant portions of the production are exported, 
seems to be dominated by partnership agreements. 
The value chain in the industry includes several independent stages of 
production (see Figure 01). 
   
Figure 01 - Vertical integration in the poultry industry 
Source: Henry and Rothwell 1995:2 
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Large geographical proximity between growers and slaughter plants where 
there are many growers and relatively few slaughter plants leads to relatively high 
interdependency between actors in the industry. This way of organizing the 
production helps to lower the costs, for instance transport costs, and thus contributes 
to the profitability of the industry. Large units in a geographically small area can thus 
be preferable. 
In the literature we can see that the constructions of specialized production 
facilities represent a significant investment for growers. The broiler houses are 
expanding, and technological solutions are becoming ever more sophisticated. One 
challenge is that broiler houses have limited alternative applications (MAcDONALD 
2008). Investment levels will probably vary depending on which climate zone 
production takes place, as breeding of chickens requires the ‘right’ balance between 
elements like feed, light, temperature, humidity, etc. What we can see is that livestock 
production in Denmark, with the cold winters is faced with challenges that Brazil 
would not have, as there seem to be a more ideal climate for poultry production there. 
We also notice that different groups of customers have specific demands 
regarding quality and weight of chicken and chicken products. Product pricing is a 
key competitive element in the industry (cf. HENRY and ROTHWELL 1995). 
Altogether we have many arguments pointing in the direction of substantial control 
over the supply chain. Martinez (2002) makes a point of the benefits gained from 
increased vertical control in the broiler industry, for instance lowered production 
costs, compared with the costs of independent producers, technological development, 
better disease control, better breeds, along with the lowering of costs.    
Production costs and technology as we have seen are important factors in the 
poultry industry. Henry and Rothwell (1995) argue that the issues surrounding the 
market position and margin control, biosecurity and quality, as well as economies of 
scale and optimization of capital resources have been forces that have affected the 
increased degree of vertical integration. The general impression in the food industry 
is that there is a focus on avoiding unnecessary disruptions in the production process, 
and that this is something that has helped to push forward the increased degree of 
vertical integration (GILSON et al. 2009 and MARTINEZ, 2002). 
 
3. Contracts in the poultry industry 
 
When you cannot regulate parameters like value and quantity of goods and 
services within a hierarchy, or by means of market competition, the contract is a 
sensible way to regulate them. The contract helps to define a social structure, in that 
it contributes to the coordination of bilateral relations, for instance; it is helpful 
regarding economic coordination, and in ensuring coordination when it comes to 
procedures, incentives, authority, coercion and conflict resolution. The contracts also 
help to provide information about how participants conceptualize policy and 
decision-making structures as the framework for their action (see e.g. BROUSSEAU 
and GLACHANT, 2002). 
A normal approach to the study of contracts would be agency theory. Within 
this approach the key idea is that “principal-agent relationships should reflect 
efficient organization of information and risk-bearing costs” (EISENHARDT, 
1989:59). The basic human assumption is self interest, bounded rationality and risk 
aversion. Furthermore, there is the assumption on partial goal conflict and 
information asymmetry. 
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In a discussion about the length of a contract Klein et al. (1978) point to long-
term contracts as the primary alternative to vertical integration where the main 
challenge is to seek to curb opportunism. Looking at the relationship between 
integrator and breeders, it seems to be relatively long-lasting and stable. MacDonald 
(2008) let us know that the average length of the relationship between the integrator 
and breeder is 13 years. The contract period may, however, vary widely, from 
contracts relating to individual flocks to long-term contracts up to 15 years. Breeders 
with the most up to date technology tend to have the longest contracts while breeders 
with older production facilities have contracts of shorter duration. Thus, production 
technology seems to be the core argument for maintaining or discontinuing a 
relationship.  
What is interesting is that within the principal-agent tradition there seems to 
be an assumption that an actor's ex ante can deduce his way to an optimal contract 
(KNUDSEN, 1997). This is the same position that Williamson (1985) holds as he 
writes “The future therefore holds no surprise; all the relevant contracting action is 
packed into ex ante incentive alignments” (p.27). Using agency theory as an 
analytical approach might be challenging as it is described as comparative-static, 
comparing one situation with another. “What the analysis reveals, therefore, is a 
ranking of alternative situations, given the (efficiency) criterion employed. It will 
not tell you how the present situation may evolve or how to get from here to there if 
you are now in an inferior situation” (DOUMA and SCHREUDER, 2002:252).  
From economic theory, efficiency improvements normally are explained as 
technical efficiency, dynamic efficiency or allocative efficiency. In poultry production 
all of these measures are at play. In chicken breeding the main focus is on feed 
conversion (technical efficiency). There is also, of course, very much focus on 
genetics. At the processing plant there is focus both on improvements on the 
slaughtering and processing part – mechanization, and to some degree on developing 
new products (dynamic efficiency). Overall there is a concern about the market 
situation (allocative efficiency). An interesting part here is what the drivers behind 
efficiency parameters are, market share, competition, regulations, company policies, 
etc. As it is “efficiency considerations are in part manifest in the assumed thoughts 
and behavior of economic actors” (DOUMA and SCHREUDER, 2002:249). 
Contract-based solutions in the poultry industry cover the area between the 
spot market on one extreme and vertical integration on the other. The literature is in 
some ways comprehensive, as various details are discussed. In other ways the 
literature is limited, as there are only a few participants in the discussion and much of 
the literature is related to the poultry industry in United States (MARTINEZ, 2002; 
MAcDONALD et al. 2004; MAcDONALD, 2008; TSOULOUHAS, 1999; 
TSOULOUHAS and VUKINA, 1999; VUKINA, 2001; LEVY and VUKINA, 2002; WU, 
2003; LEVY and VUKINA, 2004; LEEGOMONCHAI and VUKINA, 2005; VUKINA, 
T. and LEEGOMONCHAI, 2006; WU, 2006; ZHENG and VUKINA, 2007; VUKINA 
and ZHENG, 2007; DUBOIS and VUKINA, 2009; VUKINA and ZHENG, 2011). 
We can see from the literature that both marketing contracts and production 
contracts are used. The predominant form of contracts is, according to Martinez 
(2002), the production contract while marketing contracts cover only a few 
percentages of the production. In short, through the marketing contract the breeder 
has control over both means of production and production decisions while the 
production contract is such that the integrator has substantial control over 
production decisions and/or means of production. Marketing contracts are 
performance-based, and the breeder receives payment for the results obtained, while 
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production contracts at the outset are more of the behavioral kind of contracts, and 
the breeder receives a payment for the services rendered (MAcDONALD et al., 2004; 
MAcDONALD, 2008).  
The key competitive elements involve the utilization of feed, reductions of the 
mortality of chicken, and production of kilograms of live birds (VUKINA and 
ZHENG, 2007). This is of course optimized through the construction of the contracts. 
Vukina (2001) has shown that the production contract has been under development, 
where the most common today are so-called tournament contracts: “Tournaments 
are labor contracts in which an individual's payoff depends on his or her own 
performance relative to that of others” (VUKINA and ZHENG, 2011:1). The layout of 
the contract may vary, but the point is that the contract is setup to stimulate 
competition among breeders to deliver the best possible results. The latest 
development is that contracts include a market clause in which the payment to the 
breeder is also dependent on market fluctuations. According Vukina (2001) the 
performance element of the contract constitutes between 50 and 100% of the 
payment to the breeder. For the breeder the performance element of beneficence will 
thus be a very powerful incentive. 
When it comes to other aspects of research on contracts in the poultry 
industry, we can see that there is a focus on balancing the contracts to avoid 
opportunism. See e.g. Tsoulouhas (1999) which discusses the two-sided moral hazard 
problem, Dubois and Vukina (2009) who discuss the optimal incentive opportunity 
for opportunism, Leegomonchai and Vukina (2005) which discusses the dynamic 
incentives and the possibility of discrimination by agents. It is pointed out that 
opportunistic behavior can be exercised by both the principal and the agent. From the 
principal's point of view, opportunism can be carried on by the unequal treatment of 
breeders with quality and quantity of input (chicken and feed). A feature which is also 
considered as opportunism is that the principal fails to offer long-term contracts to 
individual breeders, but continues to keep them on contracts for individual flocks of 
chicken. From the breeder's perspective it is all about classic things to reduce their 
own effort (shirking), if the basic conditions are good. In addition, it is about to hold 
back on investments to upgrade farms. This will of course in the end represent a loss 
for all parties. The research shows that opportunism is not profitable while we are 
talking about long-term relationships. From the principal's hand, the discrimination 
of breeders increases transaction costs and thus they risk a loss of reputation. 
Considering the research cited above, it creates an impression that tournament 
contracts with an extreme competitive focus are standard within the poultry industry. 
What has to be emphasized is that much of the research referred to has its origins in 
the US poultry industry. 
 
4. Data 
 
In this article we look into two cases, one in Brazil and one in Denmark. Brazil 
is the third largest producer of chicken, behind US and China. Denmark is part of the 
EU, where UK, France and Spain are the bigger producers.  Both the Brazilian and 
the Danish companies are mass producers of chicken. Data for this study is collected 
through literature studies, document studies, official statistics (FAOSTAT) and 
interviews. 
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4.1 Lar – the Brazilian case 
 
Based on statistics from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations), Brazil produced about 11.588.139 tons of chicken in 2012. Brazil has 
a steady, but slow growth in the poultry production. The average growth rate per year 
for the last 50 years is about 12,2 % based on numbers from FAOSTAT. 
The LAR Company (our case) is one of many poultry producers in Brazil. It is 
located in the Parana State, nearby Matelândia city, about 75 km from Foz do Iguacu 
city. One of the bigger competitors, Sadia, which is one of the brands in the Brazilian 
Food Company (BFR), is located in Toledo city, just 80 km from the LAR Company. 
Based on LAR’s annual report for 2012 (LAR, 2012), and the annual report of the 
Brazilian Poultry Association, we can estimate LAR’s share of the Brazilian poultry 
production to be slightly above 1 % where about 50% is exported. On the export 
market there are 31 registered Brazilian poultry producers.   
Taube-Netto (1996) describes a situation where Brazil has some inherent 
advantages for chicken production. At the same time Nunes (2004) gives a 
presentation of the systematic approach to many details in developing the industry 
into what it is today.  
The LAR Company operates as an integrator that owns most of the production 
process (parent birds, hatchery, feed mill, and slaughter/processing plant). The only 
part of the process that is contracted is the breeding of the chickens. The daily 
capacity at the slaughtering-/processing plant is about 300.000 chickens, so the 
company is in need of a big number of breeders. At the time of data collection they 
have contracted 450 breeders, while at the same time working to duplicate the 
production at several of the breeders. This is considered a better solution than 
searching for new breeders as there is competition among integrators to contract 
breeders. Economically it is also a sound solution.  
Of the 450 breeding farms, 104 have ISO-certification, which is required in 
relation to the export market. The number of breeders with ISO-certification will be 
increased to about 200. The reason why all breeders will not have this certification is 
because there is a limited export market. The breeders that are contracted are all 
Brazilians located in proximity to the processing plant.  
LAR provides breeders with day old chicks; actually the policy is to get the 
chicks out in the field within six hours. The company also provides technical 
assistance, medicines, supplies, transportation, food, chick collection and slaughter. 
Using feed or medicine from another supplier means the LAR Company will 
terminate the contract with the breeder, as they need to have total control of the 
production process. 
 
4.2 Danpo – the Danish case 
 
Based on statistics from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations), Denmark produced about 177.000 tons of chicken in 2012. 
Denmark has a steady, but slow growth in the poultry production. Based on numbers 
from FAOSTAT, an average growth rate per year for the last 50 years is about 2,1 %. 
From the Danish Agriculture & Food Council (www.lf.dk, 28.10.13) we find that there 
are two major poultry companies, Lantmännen Danpo and Rose Poultry, both 
producing about 200.000 chickens daily.  
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Danpo is located in Aars in the northern part of Denmark. The competitor 
(Rose Poultry) is also located in the same part of Denmark, only 80 km from Aars. 
About 50-60 % of the Danpo production is exported, mainly to EU-countries. What 
should be mentioned is that Danpo received the Productivity Price from Danish 
Industry1 for 2013 for their productivity improvements over the last years. In a press 
release from Danpo we can read that they have made efficiency improvements of 135 
% over the last six years. Danpo has recently become a part of Scandi Standard, 
owned by CapVest Equity Capital Ltd. (52 %) and Svenska Lantmännen (48 %). 
Scandi Standard is the biggest producer of chicken products within the Nordic 
countries.  
When we look at the organization of Danish poultry production, we can see 
that it is not vertically integrated. The processors do have production contracts with 
chicken breeders. The length of the contract can vary, but breeders with new 
production facilities do have contracts without time limit, but with a 1 year notice of 
termination. The processors buy the contracted quantity of broilers. They also 
approve which supplier the breeders can buy day-old chicks and feed from. “Until 
2000, the four private Danish poultry slaughterhouses together determined the 
price, but The Danish Competition Council has prohibited this practice” (OLESEN, 
2002:243). The payment consists of a standard price per kg and bonus based on 
elements like quality, loyalty (contract bonus), new production facilities, no 
salmonella or other diseases.  
The 80 breeders delivering chicken to Danpo are organized in a production-
union, Prodan, which represent the breeders in negotiations with Danpo. Breeders 
delivering chicken to Rose Poultry also have their own organization, LRP. The 
average production per breeder was 679.000 chickens in 2011 (Economics of 
agricultural activities 2011, Danish statistics). 
 
4.3 Comparative data 
 
4.3.1 Governance structure 
 
In Figure 02 the governance structure in the Brazilian and the Danish 
company is displayed. As we can see, there is a great difference. Whereas LAR seems 
to keep strong control over their business, Danpo seems to be in less control over the 
chain of production. 
 
                                                 
1 http://di.dk/Virksomhed/Produktion/Produktivitet/Nyheder/Pages/Envedholdendeindsatsienpressetbranche.aspx (28.10.13) 
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In Table 01 we can see in more detail some of the variables that have to be 
included when making strategic decisions on how to organize the production. 
 
Table 01 – Comparison of governance structure 
 LAR (Brazil) Danpo (Denmark) 
Governance structure Unified governance Market governance 
Integrated parts of the 
value chain 
All except breeders None 
Domestic competitors on 
the export market 
30 1 
Percentage of total 
production 
1 % 50 % 
Daily production of 
chickens 
286.000  190.000 
Export  50 % 50 % 
Breeders 400 80 
Competition for breeders Strong Strong 
 
What we can see is that the Brazilian company is close to the US model that we 
use as a benchmark, keeping strong control of the value chain in the poultry 
production. The Danish company is on the other end of the scale, with less direct 
control. One big difference between the two companies is the degree of domestic 
competition they are faced with. The Brazilian company only controls 1% of the total 
poultry production and has 30 competitors on the export market, whereas the Danish 
company controls about 50% of the Danish poultry production and only has one 
competitor on the export market. Both companies are experiencing fierce 
competition for good breeders.  
 
Figure 02 – Comparison of governance structure 
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4.3.2 Production contracts 
 
Both companies do have production contracts with the farmers breeding the 
chickens. The production contracts between integrator and breeders are of great 
importance as they deal with the single most important element that the whole 
industry is founded on, the chickens. The two companies, LAR and Danpo, have 
chosen a similar main approach as they have a somewhat collective, trust based, 
developmental, and helpful approach, but they never forget the controlling aspect of 
the contract. At the delivery date the chickens should meet an expected average 
weight, as this has to do with the calibration of the processing line at the slaughter-
house. The chickens should also be of expected quality. 
Both companies do have the possibility to run tournament contracts but 
neither do so. There is no direct competition between breeders. They use different 
types of incentives, but the bottom line is that the breeders have to focus on 
heightening quality and lowering production costs to earn a decent living. The 
distribution of risk between integrator and breeder is different between the two cases. 
In the Brazilian case the integrator takes more risk than in the Danish case and the 
farmers take less risk in their contract with LAR than the Danish farmers do in their 
contract with Danpo. The details are summarized in Chart 01. 
 
Chart 01 – Comparison of production contracts 
 LAR (Brazil) (Danpo) Denmark 
Production contracts  Ongoing 
(standard contracts) 
3-5 years 
(standard contracts) 
 Input Integrator provides birds, 
feed and medical 
assistance 
Breeder buying birds, feed 
and medical assistance 
 Performance 
indicator/s 
Productivity formula: 
 Weight  
 Mortality 
 Feed conversion 
 Days of breeding 
Number of birds  
(at target weight) 
Also measuring:  
- Ammonia combustion  
- Broken wings and legs  
- Size of breast fillets 
 Competition  No direct competition 
between breeders 
No direct competition 
between breeders 
 Dialog With breeders and 
breeders ‘association’ 
With breeders and 
breeders association 
 Risk  - integrator All input Guaranteed price and 
profit 
 Risk – breeder Breeding facility All input and breeding 
facility 
 General contractual 
approach/relation 
Collective, trust based, 
developmental, helpful, 
but also controlling 
Collective, trust based, 
developmental, helpful, 
but also controlling 
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4.4 Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Choice of governance structure 
 
The benchmark for choice of governance structure in the poultry industry is 
vertical integration. Then we are supposed to eliminate what Perry (1989:185) calls 
“contractual or market exchanges”. The Brazilian case is very close to this ‘extreme’ 
definition of vertical integration, but still a vital part of the value chain is left outside 
the hierarchy. Here, the argument made by Klein et al. (1978) can be helpful, as they 
claim that long-term contracts are an alternative to vertical integration if the main 
challenge is to deal with opportunism. As we can see from the data, the production 
contracts are ongoing. The Brazilian case seems to be captured by what Robertson & 
Langlois (1995) term the property-right view of economic organization. The Danish 
case does not fall under the definition of a vertically integrated firm, not even the 
weaker position Perry (1989) describes where ”a firm can be described as vertically 
integrated if it encompasses two single-out-put production processes.” (p. 185). 
Even the argument of the long term contract, provided by Klein et al (1978) is of help 
in defining the Danish poultry production as vertically integrated. Using Robertson & 
Langlois (1995) the Danish case seems to be closer to the nexus of contract view of 
the firm. This means the company will miss some of the important advantages a 
hierarchical structure has, as Williamson (1971) explains it, e.g. constitutional 
authority.  
The implicit arguments for establishing a vertically integrated firm in Brazil 
are of course the need to be in control of the quality of end product reaching the 
market, and also being able to compete on the world market. Being vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior does not seem to be an option. The Danish case is more 
complicated to understand when using transaction cost theory. The ‘normal’ 
solutions should be vertical integration, not the more market-like solution that we 
can see. In many ways you have to understand and accept the Danish tradition 
regarding division of labor within the agriculture business. Even if it, from the outset, 
seems to be a very market-based approach to the production, traditions and 
interdependence keeps the structure together. This is, though, beyond the rationality 
of transaction cost theory.  
 
4.4.2 The production contracts 
 
There are several things of interest regarding the production contracts. Both in 
Brazil and Denmark there is a strong competition between integrators to contract 
chicken breeders. At the same time we can observe that both LAR and Danpo use 
standardized contracts. A normal approach would be that entering a contract is 
voluntary, and if there is competition for your services, you have a possibility to 
negotiate on the contractual terms. This is not happening, at least not on an 
individual basis. Breeders accept the standard contract. This might of course be a 
decision based on transaction cost assessments from both sides (an estimation of 
negotiation power) but it can also be based on the collective mindset we find within 
agribusiness; dialogue between the integrator and breeders' association. Another 
point of interest is the length of the contracts. LAR provides ongoing contracts, which 
can generate an impression of a vertically integrated system (KLEIN et al. 1978). The 
Danpo approach with time limited and also relatively short contracts back up the 
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impression of a system that is not integrated, but more market based. Then, there is 
the combination of variables in relation to incentives, risk and control. As integrator 
LAR takes a lot of risk, as they are responsible for all input used by the breeders. They 
also take a huge responsibility in the breeding process, following up on and 
controlling the breeders. This makes it all seem more like a behavioral contract 
(EISENHARDT, 1989). The incentive, based on the performance indicators, is tipping 
the contract in a result based direction. All in all this represents a combination of 
behavioral based and result based contracting. The Danpo contract leaves more of the 
risk on the breeders, as they are responsible for all input. The breeders are supposed 
to deliver the right amount of chickens at target weight at the right time, which will 
classify as a result based contract (EISENHARDT, 1989). What Danpo has done is to 
implement an automatic control system that will help them evaluate the quality of the 
chickens they receive. The system also, indirectly, can be used to feedback 
information to breeders on the quality of the breeding facilities. 
Everything about the production contract provided by LAR, points to the 
direction of a vertically integrated system in which the integrator is in control of the 
whole process. The Danpo contract strengthens the impression of a market based 
production.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
What we experience both from the empirical and theoretical analysis is that 
two large integrators in the poultry industry, which are exposed to international 
competition have chosen very different ways of setting up their business. The 
Brazilian company has the property-right view of economic organization while the 
Danish company uses the nexus of contract approach. In the Brazilian company there 
is a high degree of both ownership integration and coordination integration. As 
Robertson and Langlois (1995) explain, ownership does not, by itself, lead to 
centralized control, but in the Brazilian case it seems that there is a lot of control 
through-out the value chain, as it is very important to control animal health, security 
of supply, and the ability to conduct long-term investment. By this way of organizing 
the production LAR has access to coordination mechanisms described by Williamson 
(1971). The Danish company relies heavily on the market mechanisms as they choose 
to coordinate much of their activity on relatively open-ended contracts, although 
there is a dialogue between the company and suppliers of input to the chicken 
breeders. Perhaps a good dialogue is as good as detailed contracts when it comes to 
coordinating business, especially where the market for the suppliers is very limited 
hence leading to great interdependence. As the Danish market also is a smaller 
market than the Brazilian market, and thereby more transparent, it might be helpful 
to curb potential opportunism from any of the actors. 
The question that can be raised is whether there really is a best solution. The 
governance structure of the Brazilian company is close to the benchmark we have 
chosen, while the Danish company is seemingly having a very different setup. If we 
use transaction cost as our main argument, Langlois (1997) argues that in the long 
run transaction costs (and governance costs in general) might be expected to 
approach zero, as activities have become increasingly routine. Perhaps the Danish 
agro industry is more routinized than the Brazilian. 
If we look at the production contracts, our benchmark contract is a so called 
‘two-part cardinal-tournament scheme’. Danpo is running something close to a 
Competitive mode: Vertical control and contractual design in the … 
159 
Informe Gepec, Toledo, v. 18, n. 2, p. 147-162, jul./dez. 2014 
’guaranteed-price contract’, while LAR is running a ‘basic feed-conversion contract’. 
According to Vukina (2001), the guaranteed-price contracts were popular in the 
1950’s and 1960’s, as a second generation of production contracts in the poultry 
industry. The feed-conversion contract is a third-fourth generation contract, a 
development of what is called a flat-fee contract. Both LAR and Danpo seem to be 
doing ok with their type of contracts, which both are, in my point of view, very 
different from the tournament contracts described as our benchmark.  
It is appropriate to ask if the tournament contracts are better, and if the 
Brazilian and Danish companies are lagging behind. Research comparing 
tournaments with fixed performance standards in regard to behavioral and welfare 
effects are not conclusive in one or the other direction (WU and ROE 2005). Breeder 
welfare is generally higher under fixed performance standards, but the welfare 
advantage decreases with the relative size of a common shock (e.g., outbreaks of 
disease). Speculating about contractual approach, I think that efforts to implement 
tournament contracts in a Scandinavian context will prove to be difficult based on the 
traditions with a cooperative system in the agribusiness. In a Brazilian context 
though, it might be easier, as the units (chicken breeders) are smaller and also less 
resourceful.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The question we wanted to explore in this article was how different companies 
in the same industry have chosen to approach competition in regard to governance 
structure and contractual design, broadly seen as their competitive mode. What we 
have seen is two very different ways of organizing production, even though both 
companies are concerned with the cost of production. One company is very close to 
what is described as the benchmark of the poultry industry, an integrated structure, 
and one is seemingly very distant from the benchmark. Both companies though are 
doing well. What we have not dealt with is why these differences appear in an 
industry with the same kind of worries like margin control, biosecurity, quality, and 
challenges related to avoiding production disruptions. We have touched upon it, in 
regard to differences in domestic competition and also possible differences in 
traditions in the agribusiness industry in the two countries. There might be other 
reasons why companies choose different competitive modes, e.g. different 
agricultural policy, judicial maneuverability, etc. These are tough questions that need 
to be further explored.  
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